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Non-technical Summary
Financial incentive schemes and social experiments are standard in the U.S. Mixed experi-
mental evidence on Negative Income Tax (NIT)schemes in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in
the implementation of in-work benefits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. In the 1990s,
in-work benefits were expanded in the U.S. and the U.K. and new incentive schemes such as
the Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) in Canada were tested in practice by social experiments.
In Germany, financial incentive schemes attracted very little attention prior to the 1990s.
Benefit reduction rates for (long-term)unemployed were very high and this created a poverty
trap. Furthermore, state administrators faced huge caseloads. Therefore, it was rational
from their perspective to focus on correct payment of benefits. Long-term unemployed people
received means-tested unemployment aid and/or public assistance within a very complicated
institutional setting which was simplified only recently by merging these two systems in 2005
(”Hartz IV” law).
Furthermore, evaluation culture in Germany lagged behind international standards in the
1990s. Typically, new programs were introduced and case numbers counted using ”evalua-
tors” rather than solving a fundamental evaluation problem. Non experimental studies were
rarely feasible for researchers due to data constraints and social experiments with randomized
control groups were rejected for reasons of equity.
We report empirical evidence from an innovative financial incentive scheme called ”Targeted
Negative Income Tax (TNIT)” which is a time-restricted employee subsidy for means-tested
welfare recipients and was especially designed for the German tax-and-transfer system by
Spermann (1996). This program was tested by field experiments with program and control
groups which were conducted between 1999 and 2002. Some field experiments were designed
- for the first time in Germany - as social experiments with randomized control groups.
In this paper, we focus on a quasi experiment with TNIT in Mannheim (site randomiza-
tion within the same local labour market) where a unique data set on welfare recipients in
Mannheim was accessible to a microeconometric study. We find an average treatment effect
of TNIT on the participation probability between 6.6 and 6.8 percentage points.
Since January 1st, 2005, TNIT may be offered to more than 4 million means-tested long-term
unemployed who receive ”Arbeitslosengeld II”.
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We report empirical evidence from the first field experiments to be conducted in
Germany with program and control groups between 1999 and 2002. The evaluated
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The Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT) in Germany: Evidence from a
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Alexander Spermann (ZEW and University of Freiburg) and Harald Strotmann (IAW)1
1 Introduction
In 2004, Germany managed its ”most important labor-market reform since the war” (Economist,
January 1st, 2005). The core of this reform is the merger of two tax-financed transfer schemes
- unemployment aid and public assistance to able-bodied welfare recipients into one means-
tested transfer, the so-called unemployment benefit II. Since 2005, about 2.5 million mostly
long-term unemployed people have been receiving this transfer. Furthermore, case managers
may offer them a so-called Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT=Einstiegsgeld) which is
a time-restricted German version of an in-work benefit that makes work pay within the ex-
isting transfer system. In-work benefits are well-known e.g. as Working Tax Credit/Child
Tax Credit in U.K. or as Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. and are designed to create
financial incentives outside the traditional welfare system2.
TNIT tries to circumvent the well-known poverty trap in the German tax-and-transfer sys-
tem for a certain time period. TNIT was developed by Spermann (1996, 2001) as a part of
his habilitation thesis. Although the name itself may be misleading, TNIT does make use of
the financial incentives associated with a Negative Income Tax (NIT) scheme. However, it
avoids the disadvantages such as disincentives for those already in employment, by imposing
two restrictions. First, the NIT-scheme is exclusively targeted on means-tested (long-term)
unemployed. Second, the NIT-scheme is time-restricted. These two features minimize dead-
1We are grateful to Bernd Fitzenberger, Philip Robins, Gerd Ronning and Jeff Smith for scientific consul-
tancy during the social experiments’ set-up as well as Sabine Dann, Andrea Kirchmann and Ju¨rgen Volkert
from the IAW evaluation team for their support over the years. Furthermore, we thank Miguel Gouveia,
Shannon Seitz as well as participants of the IIPF-Congress 2004 in Milan, the EALE-Conference 2004 in Lis-
bon, the Conference on Evaluation Research 2004 at ZEW Mannheim, the Royal Economic Society Meeting
2005 in Nottingham for very useful comments on an earlier draft. This draft was presented at the Euro-
pean Economic Association (EEA) Meeting 2005 in Amsterdam and the Annual Meeting of the Verein fu¨r
Socialpolitik 2005 in Bonn. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See Moffitt 2003 and Crawford/Shaw 2004 for a detailed description of the U.S. and U.K. benefit system,
respectively, as well as OECD 1997, 2003 for international comparisons.
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weight, displacement and entry effects3. TNIT highlights - like all in-work benefits - financial
incentives for welfare recipients embedded in the legal obligation to work.
This approach represents a paradigm change - at least in Germany. In the 1990s, mu-
nicipalities relied on the stick of benefit cuts rather than on the carrot of incentives. As
a result, very few cities and counties were interested in participating in field experiments
with an incentive-scheme4. Furthermore, social experiments with randomized control groups
were completely new for local administrators in Germany and they were consequently very
reluctant to engage in such experiments5. Finally, field experiments with the so-called Tar-
geted Negative Income Tax (TNIT), a time restricted employee subsidy for the long-term
unemployed, were conducted in 16 cities and counties between 1999 and 2002 in Germany.
Seven of these involved social experiments with randomized control groups (Freiburg, Fulda,
County and City of Kassel, Odenwald, Offenbach, Tuebingen) carried out for the first time
in Germany. Two field experiments were conducted as so-called quasi experiments with the
special feature of a control group in the same local labor market (Frankfurt and Mannheim),
six field experiments were conducted without control groups (see Table A1 and A2).
To avoid misunderstandings with respect to the terminology, some definitions have to be
clarified. Experimental methods in labor economics are rather new tools. These meth-
ods produce experimental data: field data is derived from field experiments, laboratory
data from lab experiments (see Falk/Fehr 2003 and Bertrand/Mullainathan 2004). So-
cial experiments are defined as field experiments with random assignment in the literature
(see Greenberg/Shroder 2004, Greenberg/Shroder/Onstott 1999, Heckman/Smith 1995, Orr
1999). Quasi experiments are defined by Greenberg/Shroder (2004) as site randomized field
experiments in which some sites function as the program group and comparable sites as the
control group. Unfortunately, some authors use the term quasi experiment as a synomym for
natural experiments (e.g. Winter-Ebmer 1998), and this may confuse the reader. However,
the natural experiment approach considers the policy reform itself as an experiment and is
often labelled ”difference-in-differences” (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002).
3See Jerger/Spermann 1997, 2003 and Spermann 1999 for a detailed discussion and a comparison to EITC
and Dennis Snower’s Benefit-Transfer-Programme.
4In Bavaria, state administrators even offered funding for field experiments with TNIT but no municipality
was interested in experiments with financial incentives.
5Social experiments are still rare in Europe (see Heckman/Lalonde/Smith 1999 and Greenberg/Shroder
2004). Recently, van den Berg/van der Klaauw (2001) report results from a Dutch and Rosholm/Skipper
(2003) from a Danish social experiment.
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This paper focuses on the quasi experiment carried out in the city of Mannheim with program
and control groups in the same local labor market. Mannheim was the only site where
the number of observations was sufficient for a microeconometric analysis and data quality
satisfactory for the purposes of a microeconometric analysis. The sample consists of 914
welfare recipients. For several reasons, no other sites - including the social experiment sites
- were amenable to an econometric analysis. This was partly due to the fact that, owing
to the reluctance of local administrators, the treatment group did not actually receive any
treatment at all. Welfare recipients merely received a letter in which they were informed
about the program, even though administrators realised that only very few of the recipients
would understand what the program entailed. Second, administrative data was not reliable,
e.g. we found highly significant positive treatment effects based on administrative data
for the social experiment site Fulda where the program group really received the program,
but this result surprisingly contradicted the numbers calculated on the same data base by
administrators. Third, the number of observations was simply too small for some sites (see
Table A1 and A2).
The TNIT experiment in Germany could be called the ”small brother” of the Canadian Self-
Sufficiency Project SSP experiment. SSP was conducted as a huge social experiment during
an 8-year period of demonstration in the 1990s and involved around 9,000 single parents who
were monitored for five years after joining the experiments.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ‘poverty trap‘ in
the German public assistance system which causes disincentive effects for unemployed and
welfare recipients. Section 3 describes TNIT from the point of view of public assistance re-
cipients and the public assistance authority and compares it with the Canadian SSP. Section
4 describes implementation, evaluation design and data. Section 5 states the fundamental
evaluation problem, defines treatment and outcome of interest and discusses identification.
Section 6 reports Probit and Tobit estimates of the probability to be employed in the private
sector if welfare participants are in the program group and discusses the results. Section 7
concludes and sets out an agenda how to evaluate TNIT from 2005 onwards.
6See Blank et al. 2000, Card 2000 and Michalopoulos et al. 2005 for surveys.
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2 The poverty trap in the German public assistance
system
A common feature of most European transfer systems is the so-called poverty trap in which
a person‘s almost entire earned income is withdrawn above very low earnings disregards
(OECD 1997, 2003). Poverty traps in Germany are highly relevant for all means-tested
unemployed people and are very complicated in detail. Up to 2004, poverty traps occurred
within the federal unemployment aid system and within the public assistance system. In
2005 unemployment aid was merged with public assistance but the poverty trap remained
more or less unchanged except for the introduction of a time-restricted TNIT subject to
case managers discretion. It is a special feature of the German benefit system that the
public assistance poverty trap differs between states, cities and counties as well as household
types. In this paper, we provide a case study for the city of Mannheim in the state of
Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2000. Our description of the status quo consequently refers to the
relevant rules for the field experiment at that period of time (see Adema/Gray/Kahl 2003
for a detailed description for Germany).
The public assistance need standard is dependent on family size, housing costs and living
costs. The need standard is higher for larger families and in urban areas. In line with
common practice across OECD countries, the public assistance means test considers assets
and income of the applicant as well as of other household members. But only very few
countries take the income of parents and adult children as well as separated or divorces
spouses into account. In an international context, the German public assistance means-test
is thus highly restrictive.
The poverty trap in Mannheim is associated with a benefit reduction rate (BRR) of between
75% and 100% above a household-type specific earnings disregard. Note, that status quo
break-even gross income, i.e. the gross income you need to come off welfare, depends on
household types and varies enormously between 1,718 and 5,105 deutschmarks for single
people and families with two and more children, respectively (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
The poverty trap for welfare recipients in Mannheim in 2000 is shown in a numerical example
in Table A4. It may be illustrated with some simplifications in a well-known monthly income-
before-transfer/income-after-transfer framework in Figure 1. High benefit reduction rates
BRR are economically identical with high marginal tax rates t that reduce the welfare
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recipients’ net wage thereby making the income after transfer line flat. Note, that the 45◦-
line constitutes a world without taxes and transfers and net income line below the 45◦-line
is relevant for non-transfer recipients.
Figure 1: The poverty trap in Germany - Single person in the City of Mannheim in 2000
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Starting from an average need standard of 1,100 deutschmarks, single people face an earnings
disregard of 141 deutschmarks and a BRR of 85% up to a net income of 1,115 deutschmarks.
Above this threshold, the BRR rises to 100% up to the break-even net income of 1,374
deutschmarks. The same pattern - earnings disregard, high BRR, 100% BRR up to the
break-even net income - can be observed for all household types7. Note, that the notch of
the status quo net income line below the 45◦-line stems from an average social contributions
rate of 20% on the gross income above 630 deutschmarks. Non-linearity comes from the
tax system with increasing marginal rates above the minimum existence of about 1,000
deutschmarks for a single person.
7In fact, as the reader may notice in Table A4, the disposable income under the status quo even decreases
if singles earn a little bit above 630 deutschmarks. This is due to the BRR’s base which refers to the net
income rather than to the gross income. This very special feature is not captured in figure 2.
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3 How TNIT worked in the city of Mannheim
TNIT has three main features. First, the target group are means-tested (long-term) un-
employed people. Second, TNIT is paid as an employee subsidy to welfare recipients. The
employee subsidy is implemented as a low benefit-reduction-rate on net earnings in the pri-
vate labor market or - equivalently - as an earnings supplement, i.e. as a top-up to regular
public assistance. Third, TNIT is time-restricted, with the relevant time restriction varying
between household types.
In Mannheim, local administrators chose a special variant of TNIT which they believed best
matched local conditions. Targeting referred to the means-test rather than the duration of
unemployed. The target group consequently consists of able-bodied welfare recipients such
as long-term unemployed people on unemployment benefits for one year who have passed the
means-test. A special feature of the German system in 2000 was that those on unemployment
benefits who had already passed a means-test set by the Federal Employment Services could
also receive public assistance if they passed the tougher means-test for public assistance at
the municipality level. Second, local administrators chose a 50% earnings supplement on
gross income up to a maximum of 1,500 deutschmarks. Administrators explicitly followed
a ”Keep it simple” (KIS) strategy with regard to the low-qualified long-term unemployed
on whom they had previously tried the stick treatment. Case Managers typically explained
TNIT in the following way: ”We will finance your new Mercedes Smart by giving you
1,500 deutschmarks a month for one year if you take a job on a monthly gross income of
3,000 deutschmarks”. Third, TNIT was time-restricted for one year. However, employment
periods could be accumulated up to one year bearing in mind that the low-qualified long-term
unemployment often only find short-term jobs.
Incentives and potential disincentives of TNIT
Figure 2 provides a simplified illustration of the TNIT-incentive structure in a monthly
income before transfer/income after transfer diagram for a single person. The TNIT program
parameter in Mannheim in 2000 was the need standard or benefit level G amounting to 1,100
deutschmarks for a single person and BRR or t which is exogenously set at 50%.
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Figure 2: The Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT) in Mannheim 2000
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Source: Calculations by local administrators in Mannheim according to tax and social
contribution laws in 2000
An illustrative example for the maximum earnings supplement: A single welfare recipient
has a disposable net income of 2,600 deutschmarks for one year if he earns a gross income
of 3,000 Deutschmarks a month. In this case he could improve his disposable net income by
643 deutschmarks (earnings supplement=TNIT) compared with the status quo (see Table
A4), because he would only earn a net income of 1,957 deutschmarks without an earnings
supplement.8 After one year, he looses the earnings supplement, but in this case he would
have left welfare. Note once again, that this is only the case for single people and couples
without children. All other household types would remain on welfare with small sums even
if they stayed in their 3,000 deutschmarks job. Note, that all other cities and counties chose
more restrictive TNIT variants where welfare recipients did not receive earning supplements
if they earned a net income above the break-even point. Therefore, the Mannheim TNIT
variant was the most attractive financial incentive scheme in Germany.
Figure 2 reveals five potential disincentives of TNIT:
(1) The TNIT-after transfer line simply shifted the poverty trap to a higher income level.
All other sites chose a TNIT variant with a time-restricted notch at the household specific
8As the reader may notice in Table A4, TNIT takes account of the earnings disregard so that the TNIT
after transfer line is at least as favorable to welfare recipients than the status quo. However, this feature is
not captured in the figure for simplicity.
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break-even point. Although these are uncomfortable features of TNIT at first glance and
from a static point of view, they turned out to be negligible in practice for two reasons: (i)
Welfare recipients only have a very low probability of getting well-paid jobs due to their low
or depreciated human capital and in most cases such higher gross incomes are not within this
group‘s range of opportunities. (ii) Most welfare recipients, especially those with a somewhat
higher probability of getting a better paid job, do not like living on welfare: public assistance
payments are a bad in their utility function and recipients thus prefer to come off welfare
rather than stay on the rolls with a well-paid job.9
(2) The Mannheim TNIT version is associated with a somewhat higher break-even level than
under the status quo for single people, single mothers with one child and couples without
children due to the low BRR up to a gross income of 3,000 deutschmarks. But the status quo
break-even gross income remains unchanged for all other household types. Note that most
household types with children do not come off welfare even if they earn a gross income of
3,000 deutschmarks. Therefore, the Mannheim TNIT variant is still well protected against
windfall beneficiaries for most household types.
(3) The time restriction is associated with a loss of income after transfer because welfare
recipients drop down to the lower status quo net income line after the employee subsidy has
run out. However, TNIT counts on human capital investment as well as wage progression
within the time limit (Blundell 2002).
(4) Non-welfare recipients have a lower net income than TNIT recipients for the same gross
income for a certain time period. This may enhance the incentive to enter welfare (new appli-
cant effect). However, this theoretical argument is negligible for two reasons: (i) incumbent
workers with a minimum employment history receive in general unemployment benefits for
12 months; (ii) even if incumbent workers do not receive unemployment benefit for some
reasons they have to pass the means-test.10
(5) A delayed exit effect could be associated with TNIT because the target group are means-
tested unemployed. Once again, the hurdle means-test is the argument against the large-scale
relevance of this kind of entry effect but it could be true for unemployed with a very high
probability to pass the means-tested.
9These arguments are based on local administrators experiences.
10In summer 2004, unemployment aid recipients demonstrated against Hartz IV not only due to the lower
benefit level associated with unemployment benefit but also due to the tougher means-test.
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Overall, TNIT is associated with high financial incentives at the relevant gross income levels
for the long-term unemployed. Nevertheless, long-term unemployed people who get a higher
paid job beyond the break-even point leave welfare by construction of the TNIT-tariff al-
though the Mannheim TNIT variant removes the status quo break-even to somewhat higher
level for some household types which turned out to be negligible in practice.
Incentives for public assistance authorities
The main incentive for local policymakers to introduce TNIT was to try the carrot of a
financial incentive scheme as a complement to the stick of benefit cutting in a world of legal
obligation to work. One attractive feature of TNIT is that the system costs relatively little
to launch. First, TNIT is associated with very low administrative costs. This is mainly
because it is an in-work benefit within the transfer system. Unlike the former WFTC in U.K
or EITC in the U.S. or SSP in Canada, TNIT is designed within the ”system of last resort”
(public assistance up to 2004, unemployment benefit II since 2005) thereby integrating all
other available benefits in Germany.
To make this crucial point clearer: TNIT takes into account all other transfer programs of
the German benefit system, so that the 50%-BRR is the effective BRR. However, it is well
known from the literature that the effective BRR for welfare recipients can differ heavily from
in-work benefit schemes designed outside the system. Two examples: Dickert/Houser/Scholz
(1995) find effective BRR for the U.S. welfare recipients of up to 175% in the phase-out region
of EITC. Duncan/Giles (1996) find effective BRR for U.K. welfare recipients up to 80% in
spite of what at first appears to be a financially attractive Family Credit - a feature that
does not change substantially with Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) but improved with
the new U.K. tax credits (2004/2005) as Blundell and Hoynes (2003) point out.
The TNIT-saving mechanism is well-known to all economists familiar with NIT. It is obvious
that a 50% BRR reduces fiscal expenditures by 50% of welfare recipients‘ income. However,
this is only true if welfare recipients had not worked in the counterfactual situation. There-
fore, evaluation of TNIT had to take into account the fundamental evaluation problem (see
Section 5). Another saving mechanism is due to a special feature of German public assis-
tance whereby welfare recipients not only receive public assistance based on their household
type dependent need standard, their health expenditures are also covered. However, jobs
in the private sector - including part-time jobs - are subject to health insurance and this
immediately leads to fiscal savings for municipalities.
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Comparison of TNIT and the Canadian SSP
Like the Canadian SSP, TNIT offers means-tested welfare recipients a time-restricted earn-
ings supplement. The program rules differ in each case, however. These differences can be
understood by considering the SSP system, as illustrated in the gross income/net income
diagram shown in Figure 3 (Card (2000)). G is the benefit level for single mothers which
is independent of family size under SSP. The SSP program parameter in New Brunswick in
1994 were equivalent to a welfare system with G = $1, 250 and a BRR of 50%. Therefore,
welfare recipients net wage under SSP is w(1 − t) which is the slope of SSP’s net income
line. The exogenous program parameter G and t yield an endogenous break-even net income
Y ∗ of 2,500$ which is the intersection of the SSP net income line and the 45◦-degree line.11
Intuitively, welfare recipients receive G plus a fraction t of the difference between G/t and
G as earnings supplement if they work at least 30 hours a week which is the full-time re-
quirement h. Note, that the G-level under SSP is higher for most single mothers than the
G-level in the Canadian IA system (see Blundell 2002).
Figure 3: The Canadian Self Sufficiency Project (SSP)
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A comparison of TNIT and SSP yields four main differences. First, TNIT is implemented
as part of the German welfare system; SSP in contrast is not part of the Canadian Income
Assistance (IA) system. Second, in the SSP-system G is a fixed base payment that is
11The formula for the break-even net income: Y ∗ = G/t = 1250/0.5 = 2500.
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independent of family size, but higher than the IA level for most single mothers whereas in
the TNIT system G is dependent on family size and varies by household type. Therefore,
SSP is associated with higher financial incentives than TNIT due to fixed G on a high level.
Third, TNIT differs from SSP with respect to targeting. TNIT is open to all household
types, whereas SSP is restricted to single mothers. Fourth, TNIT is independent of hours
worked but dependent on gross income.
4 Implementation, Experimental Design and Data
The legal basis for TNIT experiments in Germany was the waiver of § 18/5 Federal Public
Assistance Act. It was exclusively designed by policymakers in 1999 after having been
informed about TNIT in previous years. On the basis of this waiver, the State Ministries
of Social Affairs in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse invited cities and counties with public
assistance competence to participate in field experiments with TNIT. In most cases, sites
were self selected on a ”first come, first serve-basis” and only in few instances were sites
selected by state administrators due to budget constraints. A total of 16 cities and counties
participated in the experiment. Site selection was thus non-random. Some, if not all of the
sites, reflect positive selection. Mannheim is one particular example of a positively selected
site, and this is problematic as far as the external validity of our results is concerned. The
funding State Ministries mandated the Tuebingen Institute for Applied Economic Research
(IAW) with the monitoring and evaluation of the field experiments (see Dann et al. 2002a,b
for final reports).
Quasi experiment in Mannheim
In 2000, Mannheim had the highest unemployment rate and the highest welfare recipient den-
sity in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Local policymakers and administrators in Mannheim mainly
relied on the stick approach in the 1990s with respect to the long-term unemployed and were
eager to implement TNIT as a carrot. Implementation was consequently successful: Target
group and TNIT variant as well as information and communication strategies were dis-
cussed intensively with the evaluation team. However, evaluation design was a controversial
issue. Municipality administrators could not accept randomized control groups due to equity
considerations and fear of protests from well-organized welfare recipients. However, admin-
istrators did agree to site randomization within the city of Mannheim. Local administrators
11
chose comparable districts within the city on the basis of socio-economic district informa-
tion such as welfare recipient density and structure as well as subjective experience-based
information. Finally, districts in the northern part of Mannheim were chosen as program
districts, while others in the southern part of Mannheim were chosen as control districts.
Program and control group welfare recipients are similar with respect to most observable
characteristics according to t-tests. While the program was also offered in the centre (special
districts), the control district (southern part of Mannheim) is only comparable with the pro-
gram group which excludes special districts. The program and control districts are part of
the same local labor market with small distances to potential employers and a well-organized
public transport system. The target group was informed about the program by letter in De-
cember and in the following time period by their case managers during regular visits to the
public assistance office. The local press were also informed several times about TNIT, and
the program even made it on the front page story on one occasion.
A group of long-term unemployed people was informed about TNIT in December 1999. Local
administrators also checked new eligibles each month and informed them about TNIT. The
intake period for TNIT in the northern part of the city was between January 1st, 2000, and
September 30th, 2001, but the evaluation period was restricted to 2000. The descriptive
interim results produced by the program were more successful than local administrators had
expected, and as of October 1st, 2001 TNIT has been implemented throughout Mannheim
(see Dann et al. 2001).
Data
We use an informative administrative data set which was set up by public case managers
in personal interviews according to the Federal Public Assistance Act. The evaluation team
received anonymized microdata on welfare recipients compromising information on stock and
new eligibles for the overall evaluation period. Unfortunately, we have not received any data
on the employment history of households involved in the field experiment so far, despite
out attempts to obtain such data from the Federal Employment Services. The data set was
modified in a number of ways: People without a job but with an income of their own were
dropped. Missing values for the income variable were replaced with zero for people without a
job. People who were already employed in so-called 630 DM part-time jobs at the beginning
of the experiment were dropped in order to sharpen the focus on participation decisions.
The data set does have one peculiar feature in that people with jobs paying wages above
12
the household’s break-even point do not turn up in the data set. This means that the
most successful people as far as employment is concerned are not included in the data set.
However, there are other potential the reasons apart from taking up new employment why
people might come off welfare, including marriage, relocation or death. Ignoring these factors
distorts any estimation of employment effects, and the evaluation team therefore conducted
a follow-up check on the residence records and social insurance numbers of all the 464 people
in the program and the control group who left the rolls in 2000. Data was only found for 138
people; residual households were eliminated from the data set. As the follow-up could only
be made for 2000, the following empirical analyses have to be limited to this time period
even though the field experiment continued for another nine months.
5 Treatment, Outcome, Identification
The definition of treatment in this case is - like with the Canadian SSP - the information
about the potential benefit of a time-restricted employee subsidy. TNIT was implemented
correctly - as described above - and treatment can thus be assumed for the program group
in Mannheim. Nevertheless, as status quo and TNIT might be difficult to understand in
detail so we checked how well welfare recipients understood the TNIT net income line and
break-even gross income. 450 program group members received a reminder by the public
assistance authority and were invited to an oral interview at the office. However, only 46
(12%) of those actually invited appeared for an interview between July and October 2000.
Several questions were especially constructed to check people‘s understanding of the financial
incentive scheme and included several examples of part-time and full-time jobs. Two results
emerged: First, people appeared to have understood the TNIT principle. Most long-term
unemployed people interviewed realised that they would retain - if not all of it as would
be the case if they were moonlighting. Second, most of the long-term unemployed people
were unclear about their break-even point. Single people in particular overestimated the
break-even. More accurate guesses were made by most single mothers with one child (see
IAW 2001).
Several outcomes are interesting as far as evaluation of TNIT is concerned: First, participa-
tion is a natural outcome of interest in this program. Second, although it would have been
interesting to have found out more about hours of work, we did not receive any information
about this topic. Instead, what we did obtain was net income data of the type which is rel-
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evant for administrators when calculating supplementary public assistance, and this is used
for Tobit estimations. Third, it would be interesting as a follow-up to know more about how
long people continued to be employed in particular jobs after the time limit expires. Fourth,
it would be possible to analyse the working poor phenomena if systematic follow-up informa-
tion was available. Some follow-up information for one point of time could be gathered for
some sites and this is included in the final reports. However, budget constraints prevented
any serious follow-up work being done.
Due to data constraints, the fundamental evaluation problem which needs to be solved is the
participation decision, and this is standard in the literature (see e.g. Smith/Todd 2005). Let
Di be a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if long-term unemployed are treated, i.e. live
in the program district and receive the offer of TNIT and 0 otherwise. Let Yi be the outcome
variable which is 1 if the individual is regularly employed at a given date. More precisely,
Y1i is the outcome in case of treatment and Y0i is the outcome in case of non-treatment. We
are actually interested in the treatment effect
∆i = Y1i − Y0i. (1)
But it is never possible to observe Y1i and Y0i for the same individual at the same time, so
that ∆i cannot be measured directly. This is the fundamental evaluation problem.
Estimation of the treatment effect by matching relies on two non-testable identifying assump-
tions. The most common parameter of interest in most evaluation studies is the average effect
of treatment on the treated (ATT),
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) = E(Y1|D = 1)− E(Y0|D = 1). (2)
which estimates the average impact of the program among those participating in it. In
general it is not an option to simply take Y1 from the treated (D = 1) and Y0 from the
non-treated (D = 0) due to possible selection bias. If caseworkers’ selection criteria are
correlated with outcome, we will have a selection bias:
E(Y0|D = 1) 6= E(Y0|D = 0). (3)
Identification is due to the selection on observables assumption, i.e. assumptions for probit
analyses and matching that identify ATT are the following:
Y0 ⊥ D|X (4)
Pr(D = 1|X) < 1 (5)
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Assumption (4) is called the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). It states that
once we control for a vector X of observable characteristics, the outcome in case of not being
treated, Y0, does not depend on participation. This is a critical assumption, because all
characteristics that influence both participation and outcome have to be observed. Assump-
tion (5) is called the common support condition. If it does not hold, e.g. Pr(D = 1|X) = 1,
then there is no individual with characteristics X who is not treated. In other words: there
is no common support for X. In this case it is not possible to estimate the counterfactual
E(Y0|D = 1, X), even if assumption (4) holds.
The crucial question is whether the identifying assumption that welfare recipients in the
southern part of Mannheim (control district) behave in the same way as the unobserved
counterfactuals in the northern part of Mannheim (program district). If we had sufficient
information on covariates that influence both participation and outcome, i.e., the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption (CIA) held, and common support is fulfilled we could use
matching and probit as an evaluation strategy. However, our data set is restricted.
Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) show that data quality is a crucial
ingredient in any reliable estimation strategy. Control group data must satisfy the following
criteria: (i) the same data sources must be used for the program and the control group, (ii)
the program and the control group must reside in the same local labour market, and (iii) the
data must contain a rich set of variables that affect both program participation and labor
market outcomes.
Out data set fulfills the first two criteria, given that we have the same data source for both
groups and we observe a control group from the same local labor market which is comparable
in most observable characteristics according to t-Tests. The crucial issue is the third criterion.
On the one hand we observe the most important determinants of the participation decision
such as age, sex, household type, education and skill level and duration of unemployment
(which is up to five years). On the other hand we do not observe individual employment
history, and selection on unobservables could therefore play an important role. Furthermore,
we do not observe pre-program data, but we could assume the household specific need
standard as a proxy for pre-program outcome of long-term unemployed. Quality checks for
matching such as pre-program tests and balancing score tests are not therefore feasible. This
is why we decided to restrict our analysis on Probit and Tobit estimations and argue that
results have to be interpreted with care. It is left to the reader to decide, whether there is
sufficient information to justify the non-testable CIA which is a prerequisite in a strict sense
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for the causal interpretation of the following Probit-results.
If the selection-on-observables assumption is accepted by the reader, coefficients of the pro-
gram group dummy in an average marginal effect Probit estimation could be interpreted as
average treatment effects (ATE) of TNIT. The ATE is the outcome which would be produced
if individuals were assigned treatment at random. It is defined as a weighted sum of the
ATT and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) in the literature (e.g. Blun-
dell/Costa Dias 2002 and Blundell et al. 2003). Average marginal effects are accumulated
and averaged individual marginal effects, not marginal effects evaluated at the mean. In our
setting, the average marginal effect of the TNIT program dummy is identical with the ATE
of TNIT.
6 Econometric Strategy
6.1 Probit estimations
As the first step in the empirical analyses, the welfare recipient’s decision to take up employ-
ment y∗i is evaluated using simple maximum likelihood probit estimation. We assume that
the utility of a welfare recipient taking up employment can be described by a linear combi-
nation of observable determinants and an i.i.d distributed random variable i accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity. As y∗i is unobservable we can only observe whether an individual
chooses to start working or not. It is assumed that the individual chooses to work, i.e. the
dependent variable y∗i has the value 1, if the latent variable exceeds a certain threshold value
s, and 0 else. The threshold s is identical for all individuals and fixed as zero without loss of
generality.
yi =
{
0 if y∗i = x
′
iβ + i ≤ 0
1 if y∗i = x
′
iβ + i ≥ 0
with i ∼ N(0, σ2) (6)
The probability P (yi = 1) can be expressed as a value of a distribution function Fi . Using the
distribution function of a standard normal distribution for Fi , a probit model is obtained.
This is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. To account for heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance are estimated.
The possible impact of TNIT on the decision to work is approximated by a dummy vari-
able which is one for all individuals living in the program regions, and zero else. Other
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determinants of the probability of taking up working an individuals’ sex, nationality and
age. In order to account for possible human capital effects the duration of unemployment at
the beginning of the experiment is also taken into account as an explanatory variable. The
degree of individual education might be measured either by the level of school education or
the level of vocational training.
As both variables for education are highly collinear, we include only dummy variables for
the level of vocational training. As the type of household can be expected to have an impact
on the decision to work, dummy variables for single people, lone parents (reference group)
and couples with or without children are used. Table 1 provides the corresponding summary
statistics focusing on all individuals that can be used for model estimation as details for all
variables included are available. Table 1 reveals that the program group consists of very low
qualified long-term unemployed who are unemployed up to five years.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N mean sd min max
Take up of employment ( 1=yes) 914 .159 .366 0 1
Sex ( 1 = male) 914 .565 .496 0 1
Nationality ( 1 = foreign) 914 .290 .454 0 1
Age in years 914 39.612 11.635 19 64
Duration of unemployment in months 914 31.244 12.951 14 60
Vocational training
Unqualified (ref. group) 914 .584 .493 0 1
Apprenticeship or similar 914 .376 .485 0 1
University of applied sciences or university 914 .039 .195 0 1
School education
No education 903 .163 .369 0 1
Low, medium secondary and comprehensive school 903 .616 .487 0 1
Grammar school 903 .221 .415 0 1
Type of household
Single person 914 .556 .497 0 1
Lone parent (ref. group) 914 .152 .359 0 1
Couple without children 914 .118 .323 0 1
Couple with children 914 .174 .379 0 1
Group
Program group (1 = yes) 700 .437 .496 0 1
Program group (incl. special districts) (1=yes) 914 .569 .495 0 1
Average marginal effects of probit estimations are presented in Table 2. Models (1) and (2)
only differ in terms of the definition of the program group depending on whether the special
districts, where TNIT was also offered, are included or not. Recall that the program was
implemented in the northern part of Mannheim (program district) and in the centre (special
districts) but that the control district (southern part of Mannheim) is only comparable with
the program district excluding special districts.
To summarize the main result of the estimation: Despite controlling for a variety of individ-
ual characteristics such as sex, nationality, age, education, duration of unemployment and
type of household, the TNIT dummy variable has a positive and significant impact on the
participation probability for both models. The average marginal effect lies between 6.6 and
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6.8 percentage points depending on the model. It is left to the reader to decide whether the
size of the effect is small, medium or large having table 1 in mind. 12 The coefficients of
the program group dummy could be interpreted as average treatment effects of TNIT if the
reader accepts the selection-on-observables assumption.
While sex does not have a reliable impact on the decision to start working, nationality
does: foreigners have a statistically significant higher probability of working than German
welfare recipients with the same characteristics. The older the unemployed individuals are
the lower is the probability that hey will take up work. Duration of unemployment also has
a demonstrably significant impact on the probability of taking up work bearing in mind the
importance of hysteresis effects. Lone parents c.p. have the highest probability of getting a
new job, although the statistical significance of this finding is not known.
12We also checked Propensity Score Matching and found similar results. These results could be reported
if referees found it useful even without quality checks such as pre-program test and balancing score test.
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Table 2: Probit Models for overall employment (average marginal effects)
(1) (2)
Model with Model with
standard program group
program group including
special districts
Sex ( 1 = male) -0.0076 -0.0082
(0.8) (0.764)
Nationality ( 1 = foreign) 0.064 0.0707
(0.065)* (0.015)**
Age in years -0.0017 -0.0021
(0.171) (0.069)*
Duration of unemployment in months -0.0028 -0.0033
(0.009)*** (0.001)***
Vocational training
Unqualified (ref. group)
Apprenticeship or similar 0.0275 0.022
(0.346) (0.408)
University of applied sciences or university 0.0151 0.1131
(0.838) (0.111)
Type of household
Lone parent (ref. group)
Single person -0.0642 -0.0615
(0.129) (0.116)
Couple without children -0.0442 -0.0537
(0.318) (0.116)
Couple with children -0.0235 -0.0206
(0.589) (0.182)
Group
Control group (ref. group - no offer of TNIT)
Program group 0.066
(0.016)**
Program group (incl. Special districts) 0.068
(0.003)***
Observations 700 914
Log-likelihood -276.94 -375.59
Wald-test 30.03 49.09
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
Pseudo-R2 0.047 0.061
Notes: Administrative data, Mannheim, 2000, p-values in parentheses. ***/**/*indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level, respectively.
The next section presents some generalizations of simple probit estimation using additional
information about the monthly net income of the employees applying Tobit estimation.
Finally, we discuss ideas for further modeling options not all of which - owing to data
restrictions - we were able to apply.
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6.2 Tobit estimations and extensions
The empirical analysis of the employment effects of TNIT has so far used simple maximum
likelihood probit estimation to focus on the decision of welfare recipients to start a new job.
Information about the monthly net income of job-starters has so far been neglected. But,
as ”it is inefficient to throw away information on the value of the dependent variable when
it is available” (Tobin 1958, p. 25), in the following section Tobit models are additionally
estimated allowing for continuous outcomes of the dependent variable for all individuals who
take up a new job.
Again, the latent utility of a welfare recipient starting a new job with a specific monthly net
income is modeled as a function of x
′
iβ and an i.i.d distributed random variable i accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity.
In this case, the Tobit model is given by
yi =
{
incomei if y
∗
i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0
with y∗i = x
′
iβ + i, i ∼ N(0, σ2) (7)
It differs from the probit model defined in Eq. (1.1) in that it maps from the latent variable
to the observed variable and in that - in case of y∗i > 0 - the dependent variable becomes
continuous. This type of model is often called a ”censored regression model” as negative
values of y∗i are mapped to zero. Estimation of the Tobit model is done by maximum
likelihood estimation and is preferable to simple OLS regression for the restricted sample of
the job-starters as the latter might lead to inconsistent estimates due to E[yi | yi > 0] > E[yi].
However, the estimation of a Tobit model might be very sensitive to a violation of the basic
model assumptions, in particular to a violation of the assumptions of homoscedasticity and
normality. We will come back to this point later. A further crucial assumption of the
standard Tobit model to be checked is, that the process driving the decision to work or not
can be explained by the same determinants as the process driving the decision ”how much
to work” as both processes are estimated in a single model. If this assumption was violated,
more general sample selection models allowing for a separate estimation of both processes
should be applied instead (see Heckman 1976, 1979).
Either a person’s mean net income or the natural logarithm of the net income is used to
check the sensitivity of the results for the continuous part of the dependent variable either.
The results in Table 3 however - as well as further results - show that the conclusions do not
depend on the shape of the dependent variable.
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Table 3: Determinants of the decision to work and how much to work - Results from ML
Tobit estimations13
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models with Models with
standard program group
program group including special
districts
Monthly net Log. monthly Monthly net Log. monthly
income: net income income: net income
Sex ( 1 = male) -111.939 -0.919 -0.506 -0.506
(0.635) (0.559) (0.691) (0.691)
Nationality ( 1 = foreign) 438.144 2.939 3.142 3.142
(0.061)* (0.061)* (0.012)** (0.012)**
Age in years -7.738 -0.037 -0.047 -0.047
(0.443) (0.581) (0.389) (0.389)
Duration of unemployment
in months -18.855 -0.116 -0.124 -0.124
(0.026)** (0.039)** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Vocational training
Unqualified (ref. group)
Apprenticeship or similar 118.568 0.598 -0.009 -0.009
(0.600) (0.692) (0.994) (0.994)
University of applied
sciences or university 206.028 1.699 4.015 4.015
(0.695) (0.628) (0.100) (0.100)
Type of household
Lone parent (ref. group)
Single person -470.017 -3.168 -2.930 -2.930
(0.119) (0.117) (0.081)* (0.081)*
Couple without children -646.050 -4.095 -3.825 -3.825
(0.123) (0.140) (0.094)* (0.094)*
Couple with children -189.539 -1.951 -1.852 -1.852
(0.594) (0.416) (0.352) (0.352)
Group
Control group(ref. group -
no offer of TNIT)
Program group 519.596 3.363
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (
Program group (incl.
special districts) 3.287 3.287
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Constant -1,034.576 -7.349 -6.276 -6.276
(0.035)** (0.025)** (0.019)** (0.019)**
Observations 679 679 886 886
Notes: p-values in parentheses.***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent level, respectively.
13The number of individuals is slightly smaller than in probit estimation due to missing values of the
monthly net income.
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The Tobit model assumes that the decision to work and the decision ”how much” to work are
estimated at the same time. The parameters in ß can be interpreted in two ways: on the one
hand, they represent the impact of a change in an independent variable on the probability
of taking up employment. On the other hand, they represent the impact of an independent
variable on the level of income. To check for the validity of this crucial assumption, the
marginal effects of the explaining variables on the probability of being uncensored and on
the latent variable should have the same sign for all explaining variables.
A closer look at Table 4 shows that this assumption is met for model (1) and that Tobit is
the correct specification in this case.
In general, it can be concluded that the results of simple probit estimations are still confirmed
even when the more general Tobit model is applied. Living in the program group region
where TNIT was offered also has a c.p. statistically significant impact on the latent variable
driving the individual’s decision process. However, as the probability of getting a new job is
rather small, the marginal impact on yi is also rather moderate (roughly 60 DM) - see Table
3, which provides information about the marginal effect of a change in a regressor upon the
expected outcome yi given by the product of the coefficient and the probability of having a
positive income. If the probability is one, the marginal effect equals the regression coefficient
in a linear model.
23
Table 4: Marginal effects for model (1) - Results from ML Tobit estimations
Probability of Marginal effect Marginal effect:
being on the latent Unconditional
uncensored variable Expected Value
Sex ( 1 = male) -0.013 -111.939 -12.419
(0.632) (0.635) (0.632)
Nationality ( 1 = foreign) .0555 438.144 54.288
(0.042)** (0.061)* (0.042)**
Age in years -0.001 -7.738 -0.851
(0.443) (0.443) (0.443)
Duration of unemployment
in months -0.002 -18.855 -2.074
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)**
Vocational training
Unqualified (ref. group)
Apprenticeship or similar .0140 118.568 13.261
(0.595) (0.600) (0.595)
University of applied sciences
or university .0259 206.028 25.098
(0.674) (0.695) (0.674)
Type of household
Lone parent (ref. group)
Single person -0.056 -470.017 -53.537
(0.111) (0.119) (0.111)
Couple without children -0.062 -646.050 -55.182
(0.203) (0.123) (0.203)
Couple with children -0.021 -189.539 -19.480
(0.612) (0.594) (0.612)
Group
Control group (ref. group -
no offer of TNIT)
Program group .062 519.596 59.735
(0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)***
Constant -0.1209318 -1,034.576 -113.820
(0.034) ** (0. 035)** (0.034)**
Observations 679
Notes: p-values in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Furthermore, the Tobit estimator might be inconsistent due to a violation of further model
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assumptions. It would be particularly important to examine wether assumptions of ho-
moscedasticity and of normality can be verified.
It is well known that the problem of heteroscedasticity is much more serious in Tobit es-
timation than in probit. The degree of censoring which is very high in our dataset might
be a primary determinant for heteroscedasticity (see Greene 2003). A Lagrange multiplier
test on the existence of homoscedasticity, however, does not lead to a rejection of the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity.14
However, the assumption of normality seems to be violated instead. A conditional moments
test for skewness and kurtosis based upon the framework of Pagan and Vella (1989) - see
Wooldridge 2002, p. 206f. - rejects the null hypothesis of normality of the errors at a 1%
level of significance. Though a comparison of the density of the estimated residuals with the
density of the corresponding normal distribution might give the impression that differences
are not that large and in particular, though the results of the upper Tobit estimations seem
to be plausible, this misspecification might have profound consequences for the validity of
the estimation (and also for the validity of the test on homoscedasticity).
A preferable alternative would be to use an estimator which is robust to changes in the
distribution and to the existence of heteroscedasticity. Powell (1984) suggests an estimator
that is based on the more robust least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator, the so called
censored least absolute deviations estimator (CLAD). This is based on an iterative procedure
starting from running LAD on the entire sample, then dropping observations for which the
predicted value is negative and rerunning LAD on this new sample. This procedure is
repeated until the estimates stop changing (see Johnston/DiNardo 1997: 444f.). However,
two problems hamper the application of CLAD to our sample. First, as the number of
censored observations is too high and the median is zero LAD estimation does not work.
Second, one should be cautious when implementing CLAD with small amounts of data
though Monte Carlo simulations suggest that it might perform well.
A second method suggested by Powell is symmetrically trimmed least squares (STLS). The
basic idea of this method is that standard OLS would produce consistent estimates of the
parameters if the error term was symmetrically distributed around zero. As censoring intro-
14The test on heteroscedasticity was based upon the alternative that σ2i = σ
2 ∗ exp(z′iα) wherby z
′
i is a
vector of explaining variables not including an intercept term. THe null hypotheses corresponds to α = 0
which implies that the variance of i is σ2. See Wooldridge 2002: 205f. or Greene 2003 for more details.
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duces asymmetry into the distribution, symmetry is regained by also truncating observations
on the other side of the distribution. However, this method is most useful when the amount
of censoring is not excessively severe and the amount of data is not too limited. We tried to
estimate the corresponding STLS model, but the incremental loss of data was too large and
it was not therefore possible to achieve satisfying convergence. Unfortunately, these data
restrictions mean we have not so far been able to realize a more robust estimation to check
the robustness of our conclusions against the problem of non-normality.
As described before, the Tobit model assumes that the decision whether or not to work and
how much to work may be explained by the same underlying latent process. This assumption
proved to be valid in our case.
We might therefore expect that the estimation of a more general sample selection model
allowing for a separate estimation of both processes would not help to improve the results.
Anyhow, as our upper results suffer from violation of the normality assumption and to further
examine the stability of our conclusions, we additionally estimated sample selection models
by using Heckman two-step estimation method. To summarize, in any case regardless of
whether we included a few variables in the selection equation or the complete set of variables
- the income equation appeared to forfeit any relevance it may have had at all if allowance was
made for a separate estimation of both processes. With respect to our analyses this means
that we have to be very careful in interpreting the Tobit results as a profound explanation for
the decision of how much to work. Whatever method of estimation is used, we are, however,
able to prove a (small) positive impact of the supply of TNIT (including the nationality of
the unemployed person and duration of unemployment) on the welfare recipient’s decision
to work. Our experiment therefore definitely helped to provide valuable insights into the
effects of TNIT in the participation decision. There are, however, still many shortcomings
which will need to be tackled in the course of further research.
7 Conclusions
For the first time in Germany field experiments with control groups were conducted between
1999 and 2002 to evaluate an active labour market program prior to its nationwide imple-
mentation. To date this has usually been done by implementing a program and subsequently
evaluating it using non experimental methods (see Fitzenberger/Hujer 2002 and Schmidt et
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al. 2001 for surveys). In most cases evaluation studies have only been based on descriptive
statistics without any control group concept.
To summarize the most important results: (1) TNIT is not associated with positive or
negative employment effects if the relevant program is not implemented properly by local
administrators i.e. if treatment is not assured. Because treatment is the provision of in-
formation about a potential benefit if a low-paid job is accepted, TNIT is very sensitive to
implementation issues; (2) Treatment was assured in the city of Mannheim where a quasi
experiment with a control group in the same local labour market (site randomization) was
conducted. We find positive employment effects with respect to the participation decision.
TNIT recipients have a higher probability of participating in the labour market than a
control group in the same local labour market. The average treatment effect is about 6.8
percentage points if the reader accepts the selection on observables assumption.
The results presented here are in line with international experiences with similar financial
incentives in Canada and Switzerland. Card (2000) and Michalopoulos et al. (2005) sum-
marize the findings from the ”Self Sufficiency Project”: a large scale social experiment in
Canada that was conducted to evaluate financial incentives for single mothers on the rolls.
The most important results: Enhanced incentives induce a significant fraction of welfare
recipients to leave the program and enter work. They also have a relatively large anti-
poverty effect. Furthermore, they can actually be associated with fiscal savings if incentives
are offered to relatively short-term recipients. Gerfin/Lechner (2002) evaluate the effects of
active labour market policy in Switzerland in the second half of the 1990s. They find that
a financial incentive scheme called Temporary Wage Subsidy appears to be the one clearly
successful program in terms of increasing opportunities in the labour market.
Social experimental culture in Germany lags far behind standards in the U.S. or the U.K..
Scientific field research is confronted by problems which would probably astonish researchers
working in the same field in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Nevertheless, these obstacles to
research are very real for economists in Germany. The results presented in this paper should
be seen against this background. Obviously, many interesting questions for researchers
remain open due to pitfalls in the implementation process the restricted involvement of
local administrators and budget constraints for academic research financed by the states’
Ministries of Social Affairs.
However, evaluation culture in Germany has dramatically changed in the wake of the four
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”Hartz laws”. The Federal Ministry of Labor mandated two well-known German Economic
Research Institutes - the Essen-based RWI and the Mannheim-based ZEW - to develop
non-experimental evaluation designs with control groups in 2003 (see Fertig/Kluve 2004 and
Hagen/Spermann 2004). Most data will be accessible via scientific use files.
TNIT was legally implemented in January 2004 by the Hartz IV Act (see Viertes Gesetz
2003) on the basis of the small positive employment effects on the micro-level found in the
evaluation and documented in the final reports in 2002 as well as on the basis of positive
international experiences with ”carrot incentives to complement the stick” of sanctions for
welfare recipients. However, the political reality is that nationwide TNIT assigns a crucial
role to case managers. It is they who decide whether TNIT will be offered to welfare recipients
or not.
A nationwide TNIT is a new opportunity to evaluate this program more broadly by non-
experimental methods. Hagen/Spermann (2004) set out an agenda on how to evaluate TNIT
between 2004 and 2008. They suggest that microeconometric evaluation should distinguish
between three economic variables to measure the program’s success, and macroevaluation
should use regional variations between labour market districts to evaluate the program. For
microeconometric evaluation purposes three economic effects are of interest. First, the tran-
sition from unemployment to employment with TNIT. Second, the transition from subsidized
employment to unsubsidized employment. Third, the duration of unsubsidized employment
after a subsidized employment spell. Treatment and outcome variables depend on the issue
addressed. First, the relevant treatment for evaluating the transition from unemployment to
subsidized employment is the offer of a potential benefit by case managers whereby the out-
come variable is participation in the labour market. In this case, the case manager’s decision
enables a control group to be constructed. Second, in order to evaluate the second transi-
tion from subsidized employment to unsubsidized unemployment treatment must be defined
as employment with TNIT and outcome as transition in non-subsidized employment with
TNIT recipients as the program group and employed people without a TNIT-spell as the
control group. Third, in order to evaluate the duration of employment, treatment must be
defined as TNIT payment and the outcome as duration of employment following transition
into regular employment. The program group would be made up of people with TNIT and
the control group of people without TNIT. Differentiated program and control group com-
parisons may yield positive employment effects with respect to all three economic variables.
A macroevaluation may reveal that indirect effects such as deadweight and displacement do
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not play a role.
Time-restricted financial incentive schemes such as TNIT and SSP are just one way of cir-
cumventing the poverty trap for a certain time period. At best, TNIT might provide a
stepping stone into the normal labour market and might prove fiscally attractive for policy-
makers. However, evaluation strongly suggests that this instrument does not offer a panacea
for the labour market. At best, TNIT might be one possible piece in a larger puzzle - a
broader and more coherent employment strategy that activates the unemployed rather than
passively paying unemployment benefits or public assistance.
Reforming active labour market policy in Germany has become an important issue, partidu-
lary in academic debate (e.g. Schmidt et al. 2001 and Fitzenberger/Hujer 2002). Several
authors favour financial incentive schemes rather than public employment programs (e.g.
Fertig et al. 2002). Reforming public assistance has also become an important issue, al-
though radical reform proposals have attracted very little support in the political debate
(e.g. Sinn et al. 2002). More moderate reform proposals have been made by the Council
of Economic Advisers, although they have not yet been subject to intensive political debate
(Sachversta¨ndigenrat 2003). Finally, welfare-to-work strategies have grown increasingly pop-
ular since 2004 (Zimmermann 2003). However, this strategy could prove very expensive in
fiscal terms if it is mainly public sector jobs which have to be provided for welfare recipients.
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Table A3: Poverty trap and break-even gross income
No Household type Average
monthly Maximal Maximal Break-even
need additional disposable gross
standard income income income
I single people 1100 274 1374 1718
II single mother with one child 1850 365 2215 2769
III single mother with two children 2450 365 2815 3519
IV single mother with three or more children 3700 365 4065 5081
V couple without children 1700 274 1974 2468
VI couple with one child 2200 274 2474 3093
VII couple with two children 2700 274 2974 3718
VIII couple with three or more children 3810 274 4084 5105
41
Table A4: TNIT in Comparison with the Status Quo - City of Mannheim, Household Type
Single person
Average Monthly Monthly
monthly Monthly Monthly disposable disposable Earnings
need gross net income at income with Supplement
standard income income status quo TNIT (TNIT)
1100 100 100 1200 1200 -
1100 141 141 1241 1241 -
1100 200 200 1250 1250 -
1100 300 300 1265 1265 -
1100 400 400 1280 1300 20
1100 500 500 1295 1350 55
1100 600 600 1310 1400 90
1100 700 560 1303 1450 147
1100 800 640 1315 1500 185
1100 900 720 1327 1550 223
1100 1000 800 1339 1600 261
1100 1100 860 1348 1650 302
1100 1200 956 1360 1700 340
1100 1300 1035 1372 1750 378
1100 1400 1115 1374 1800 426
1100 1500 1195 1374 1850 476
1100 1600 1270 1374 1900 526
1100 1700 1328 1374 1950 576
1100 1800 1387 1387 2000 613
1100 1900 1442 1442 2050 608
1100 2000 1500 1500 2100 600
1100 2100 1552 1552 2150 598
1100 2200 1602 1602 2200 598
1100 2300 1649 1649 2250 601
1100 2400 1695 1695 2300 605
1100 2500 1741 1741 2350 609
1100 2600 1788 1788 2400 612
1100 2700 1833 1833 2450 617
1100 2800 1873 1873 2500 627
42
1100 2900 1916 1916 2550 634
1100 3000 1957 1957 2600 643
1100 3100 1999 1999 2600 601
1100 3200 2042 2042 2600 558
1100 3300 2088 2088 2600 512
1100 3400 2134 2134 2600 466
1100 3500 2179 2179 2600 421
1100 3600 2224 2224 2600 376
1100 3700 2268 2268 2600 332
1100 3800 2312 2312 2600 288
1100 3900 2357 2357 2600 243
1100 4000 2401 2401 2600 199
1100 4100 2443 2443 2600 157
1100 4200 2487 2487 2600 113
1100 4300 2530 2530 2600 70
1100 4400 2573 2573 2600 27
1100 4500 2616 2616 2600
43
